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Recent Developments

Brown v. State:
Spousal Privilege Allows for the Confidentiality of Marital Communications by
Bestowing a Privilege, Waivable Upon the Spouse Making the Communication
By Christopher Mason
n a case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that section 9-105
of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland
("section 9-1 05") does not render
one spouse incompetent to testify
against the other spouse. Brown v.
State, 359 Md. 180, 753 A.2d 84
(2000). Instead, the court held that
section 9-105 merely bestows a
privilege upon the spouse making
the communication that is
exercisable and may be waived by
the same spouse. The court
grounded its holding on the basic
principles of statutory construction.
On September 10, 1995, Keith
Brown ("Brown") allegedly
murdered his mistress, Makea
Stewart. During petitioner's trial
for the murder, his wife, Ms.
Brown, testified during the state's
case-in-chief that Brown had
confessed to her that he had killed
Ms. Stewart. After the completion
of her testimony, Brown's attorney
objected to the testimony based
upon section 9-105, arguing that the
testimony given by Ms. Brown was
inadmissible because it was a
confidential communication
between husband and wife.
The trial judge originally ruled
in favor of the defense, but later
reconsidered its ruling in light of

I

Harris v. State, 37 Md. App. 180,
376 A. 2d 1144 (1977), where the
court of special appeals held that
section 9-105 did not apply when
the confidential communication
constituted a threat or crime against
the other spouse. The trial judge
held that Brown's 'my spouse did
it' defense, raised at different times
throughout the trial, put Ms. Brown
at risk, and thus, precluded Brown
from invoking section 9-105. The
judge concluded that, although
section 9-105 is a competency
statute, it would be unfair to
disallow Ms. Brown an opportunity
to reply to the accusations raised
by her husband, which is exactly
what the exclusionary provision of
section 9-105 would do.
Consequently, Ms. Brown's
testimony was deemed admissible
and, as a result, Brown was a
convicted of first-degree murder
and various handgun offenses.
The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland affirmed the
convictions in an unreported
opinion. The court held that section
9-105 is a privilege statute, not a
competency statute, and this
privilege is waived when a 'my
spouse did it' defense is raised. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to determine the
following: (i) whether section 9-105
is a privilege status or a competency

statute; (ii) if, in fact, it is a
privilege statute, can that privilege
be waived; and (iii) if the privilege
is waived in the case at bar.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by looking to the principles
of statutory construction. Brown v.
State, 359 Md. 180, 188,753 A.2d
84, 88 (2000). The court concluded
that its primary objective was to
ascertain the Legislature's intent in
enacting, and periodically
amending, the statute. !d.
Ordinarily, if the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous,
then the analysis will end at this
point. !d. However, the court
stated that if a literal reading is
inconsistent with the purpose of the
legislative intent, the court can look
beyond that literal meaning, and
"may consider the consequences
resulting from one meaning rather
then another, and adopt the
construction which avoids an
illogical or unreasonable result, or
one which is consistent with
common sense." !d. at 189, 753
A.2d at 88 (quoting Tucker v.
Fireman sFund Ins. Co., 308 Md.
69, 75,517 A.2d 730,732 (1986)).
In discerning the intent of the
legislature, the court of appeals
determined that section 9-105
"cannot be considered in
isolation," and looked to the
general rule set forth in section 9-
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101 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article of the
Annotated Code for guidance. !d.
at 189, 753 A.2d at 89.
Additionally, the court opined that
it is sometimes "necessary to look
at the development of a statute ... "
to assess the legislature's intent. !d.
(quoting Condon v. State, 332 Md.
481, 492, 632 A.2d 753, 758
(1993)).
Reviewing the history of
section 9-105, the court found that
the Maryland General Assembly
established a spousal privilege by
enacting a statute in 1964 that
prohibited one spouse from giving
evidence for or against the other
spouse in a criminal proceeding,
and forbade the disclosure of
marital communications in any
proceeding, civil or criminal. !d.
at 195, 753 A.2d at 92. Repealed
by the legislature in 1876 for
ancillary reasons, the court of
appeals, believing this retraction
was inadvertent, still followed the
provisions as a result of their
common law roots. !d. at 196, 753
A.2d at 92 (citing Turpin v. State,
55 Md. 462 (1881)).
Following the lead of the state
judiciary, the legislature reinstated
the spousal testimony privilege in
1888. !d. at 196, 753 A.2d at 93.
As a result of the 1888 amendment,·
the law in Maryland was that:
1) spouses were generally
competent and compellable
witnesses; 2) in criminal
proceedings, the spouse of
the
defendant
was
competent to testify, but 3)
in no case, civil or criminal,
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shall any husband or wife
be competent to disclose
any
confidential
communication made by the
one to the other during the
mamage.
!d. at 197, 753 A.2d at 93.
This language, along with the
provision that a person could not
be compelled to give adverse
testimony in a criminal proceeding
involving the person's spouse
followed the legislature's intent by
enacting section 9-105 ofthe Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article in
1973.
After a thorough analysis of
section 9-105, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that section 9-1 05
does not necessarily render one
spouse incompetent to testify
against the other spouse. !d. at 202,
753 A.2d at 96. Rather, the court
held the statute created a privilege
that allows the communicating
spouse to prevent testimony by the
other spouse that would reveal that
confidential communication, but the
confidential communication may be
waived by the spouse who asserted
the spousal communication. !d.
The court did note, however,
that due to the "solid public policy
underpinnings" of this privilege
there can be no waiver of the
privilege except in the clearest of
circumstances. !d. at 203, 753 A.2d
at 96. These circumstances include
(i) the failure to object, and (ii)
voluntary self-disclosure of the
conversation. !d. at 206, 753 A.2d
at 98. Since Brown's "my spouse
did it" defense did not encompass
either of these two circumstances,

the court concluded that the
privilege was not waived. !d.
Consequently, it reversed Brown's
convictions and remanded the case
for a new trial. Id at 206-7, 753
A.2d at 98.
Although Brown v. State will
most likely lead to more evidentiary
hearings regarding communications
between spouses in order to
determine if the communication was
confidential and therefore
inadmissible, the court properly
balanced the sanctity of marriage
and the need for confidentiality to
promote trust and harmony between
spouses. While a competency
finding would have resulted in a
bright line rule, under which
spouses could never testify under
any circumstances, the current
privilege finding allows for a
possible waiver and the
admissibility of the resulting
testimony.

